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APPLICABILITY OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, AND LACHES
DEFENSES TO PRIVATE SUITS UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT AND S.E.C. RULE 101B-5: DETERRENCE AND
EQUITY IN BALANCE
THE Securities Act of 1933,1 enacted to counteract widespread fraud in the
securities industry,2 was structured to require complete disclosure of facts
thought necessary to assure informed investing - to promote "truth in secu-
rities." 3 To insure this disclosure Congress did more than simply codify exist-
ing common law protections of defrauded investors; rather, the civil liabilities
sections of the act were designed as in terrorern provisions. By making it
easier for victims of fraud to recover, the act aimed at "terrorizing" issuers,
underwriters, dealers, and other sellers into compliance with its disclosure
requirements. 4 Occasionally, defrauded investors, instead of relying on the
protections afforded them in the 1933 act, have based their suits upon SEC
rule lOb-5,5 promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. In the last few years several cases 6 under rule lOb-5 and the civil
liability provisions of the 1933 act have allowed interposition of the defenses
of waiver, estoppel, and laches in spite of the deterrent purpose of the act and
in the absence of any mention of these common-law 7 defenses on the face of
1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958).
2. See generally H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1933).
3. See, e.g., id at 2; Dodd, How Not to Amend the Federal Securities Act - Funda-
mental Purpose Should Not Be Impaired, 20 A.B.A.J. 247-48 (1934); Legislation, 33
CoLur. L. Rzv. 1220, 1223-24 (1933) ; 77 CoNG. REc. 2912 (1933) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Mapes); Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1933).
4. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173-77
(1933), Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933) ; Feld-
man, The New Federal Securities Act, 14 B.U.L. REv. 1, 20 (1934).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1949).
6. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961),
reversing 182 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1960), applying § 12(1) of the 1933 act, allowed
interposition of the estoppel and waiver defenses, but disallowed laches. On remand, the
defenses were not established by the evidence, and the court of appeals affirmed. 312 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1962). Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1956) (Section 12(2) case,
estoppel and waiver allowed, laches not raised). Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (rule 10b-5 case, estoppel, waiver, and laches allowed).
On remand, the trial court found that the defenses were not established by the evidence.
Brief for Appellee, p. 5, Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, No. 19020, 9th Cir. 1964.
7. 'Waiver" will be used to refer to the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of
a legal right or claim; "estoppel" to refer to the denial of a plaintiff's assertion of a right,
where he has made prior representations, reasonably and detrimentally relied upon by the
defendant, which are inconsistent with the asserted right; and "laches" to refer to an
unreasonable delay in asserting a right, to the disadvantage of the defendant. To the
extent that other terms, such as ratification, abandonment, and acquiescence are used to
embody these concepts, the discussion will include them.
Although some of these defenses trace their origin to courts of equity, the term "com-
mon-law defenses" will be used to include them, unless otherwise noted.
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these laws or in their legislative history. But while these cases have posed
the issue of the applicability of the estoppel, waiver, and laches defenses under
the 1933 act and rule lOb-5, they have failed adequately to recognize the pos-
sible conflict between the general in terrorem function of the act and the al-
lowance of these defenses, which are normally available in civil actions to
assure equitable treatment of the parties.
Examination of the civil liabilities provisions of the 1933 act, sections 11, s
12(1),9 and 12(2), 10 reveals a bifurcated approach to the problem of insur-
ing dissemination of adequate information to investors: Sections 11 and 12(1)
apply to the process by which newly issued securities reach the hands of ulti-
mate investors;" section 12(2), in effect, deals with transactions after initial
distribution of the issue.12 Section 12(1) operates to implement disclosure in
two ways. First, it imposes liability on any person in the initial chain of dis-
tribution 13 of the issue who sells a security for which no registration
statement is in effect with the SEC.1 4 Second, section 12(1) imposes liability
on the same parties if they do not provide the buyer with a prospectus con-
taining information identical to that in the registration statement.Yr Section
11 complements section 12(1) by insuring the completeness and truth of those
registration statements actually filed and in effect under the act. To effectuate
8. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
9. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1958).
10. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
11. See notes 13 and 17 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
13. The extensive exceptions of certain persons and transactions from the coverage
of § 12(1) indicate that it is concerned with the transactions by which the security is
transmitted from the corporation through intermediate parties to investors. Exempted
from § 12(1) are (in simplified form) : transactions by persons other than underwriters,
issuers, and dealers as defined by the act; transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering; transactions by a dealer more than. forty days after the securities were
first offered to the public; brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on ex-
change or over-the-counter markets; issuance to present shareholders; and issuance to
creditors pursuant to corporate reorganizations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(9), (10), and 77d
(1958).
14. A registration statement is generally required to be in effect with the SEC prior
to sales involving the mails or the channels of interstate commerce which effectuate the
initial distribution of a security to investors. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a). This document must
contain, inter alia, detailed information about the financial status of the corporation and
the purpose for which the issue is being floated. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (Schedule A).
After the issuer files the registration. statement, the SEC examines it for deficiencies
and irregularities, and issues a stop order if it finds either. If no stop order is issued
vithin twenty days after filing, the registration statement becomes effective. 15 U.S.C.
877f 77h, 77i.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (b) (2) (1958). Again, the sale must involve some use of the
mails or the channels of interstate commerce in order to constitute a violation. Liability
is also incurred if any other prospectus in addition to the statutory prospectus is used.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1). Furthermore, subsection (c) of § 77e, adopted in 1954, makes
unlawful offers to buy or to sell in the absence of a registration statement.
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this purpose, section 11 grants a cause of action to any person who acquires
a security issued under a registration statement which "contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing .. ."I" Under section 11 potentially liable parties include the issuer, its
principal officers, its directors, experts to the extent of their contribution to
the statement, underwriters, and all other persons required by the act to sign
the statement.' 7
In contrast to sections 11 and 12(1), the section 12(2) civil action is
directed toward protection of buyers in single transactions after the security
has been initially distributed;18 moreover, section 12(2) does not depend on
violation of registration statement requirements or other detailed statutory or
administrative innovations. 19 Rather, section 12(2) allows the buyer to sue
his immediate seller 20 for rescission, or damages when the buyer has disposed
of the security, if the vendor sold him the security by means of any prospectus
or oral communication which contained "an untrue statement of a material
fact or [an omission of] a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading .... '-21 Despite its broadness of language, section 12(2) does not
reach the great majority of sales made on exchanges or over-the-counter mar-
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958).
17. Ibid.
18. Section 12(2) is not phrased in terms that exclude misstatements or omissions
in prospectuses used in sales involving the initial distribution; but § 12(2) does not aug-
ment the sections that already apply to this situation. Where the plaintiff has both a
§ 12(1) and a § 12(2) action, the former section will nearly always be invoked, since
under § 12(1) he has to prove only that no registration statement is in effect or that the
prospectus he received did not conform in every detail with the registration statement,
whereas under § 12(2) he must prove a misstatement or omission of a material fact in
the prospectus. Where the plaintiff has both a § 11 and a § 12(2) action and the defend-
ant is the issuer, the § 11 action is more advantageous to the plaintiff, because it is not
subject to the defense of a lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the misrepresen-
tation, as would be an action under § 12(2). Where other defendants potentially liable
under either section are involved, the plaintiff's burdens are substantially the same under
§§ 11 and 12(2) : he must prove a misstatement or omission of a material fact in the
registration statement (§ 11) or in the prospectus he received (§ 12[2]), and in both
actions he is subject to the innocent misrepresentation defense.
Section 12(1) exempts dealers selling the securities more than 40 days after the initial
public offering, and § 11 exempts all dealers; insofar as these parties can be reached as
sellers under § 12(2), there may be exceptional cases in which § 12(2) will be employed
in an action against persons in the chain of initial distribution.
19. See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
20. This requirement of privity is tempered by § 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1958), which imposes liability on parties in a position of control over persons primarily
liable.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958). However, if the buyer knew of the defect when he
acquired the security, his action fails. Ibid. As with § 12(1), the sale must involve some
use of the mails or the channels of interstate commerce in order to constitute a violation.
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kets,22 because of the infrequent use of a prospectus by sellers in these trans-
actions, and because of the factual difficulty in establishing who the "seller"
was.
23
In lawsuits under these three sections of the Securities Act defendants have
sought to interpose defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct after he has
learned of the violation and on the defendant's detrimental reliance upon such
conduct.2 4 The types of conduct alleged in such defenses may involve,25 inter
alia: (1) laches, in which the plaintiff waited a considerable length of time
after discovery of the violation before bringing suit;26 (2) waiver, in which
the plaintiff intentionally relinquished his claim or used it as a lever to gain
other concessions;27 (3) estoppel, in which the plaintiff: participated with
the defendant in issuing the faulty registration statement or prospectus; or
participated in the affairs of the business - all the way from voting, 28 giving
proxies, 29 and accepting dividends 30 to accepting an officership or director-
ship,31 and actually assuming control of the corporation ;32 or made additional
payments on the purchase price after learning of the violation; or refused an
offer of rescission made after both parties were informed of the violation and
the available cause of action.
33
The Securities Act does not explicitly state whether these defenses can be
used in actions under the civil liabilities sections. The legislative history,
moreover, contains no evidence of congressional intent on the precise issue.34
22. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78hh (1958), is the major federal source of regulation of these transactions.
23. However, brokers are liable as sellers in transactions outside the exchange or
counter markets. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940).
24. These assertions might also be used by a plaintiff-creditor suing the stockholders
of the debtor corporation on their unfulfilled stock pledges, when the defendants use as
a defense the invalidity of the agreement to buy stock.
25. Not all of these situations have arisen under the Securities Act, but in view of
Blue Sky and other securities litigation, it is not unrealistic to anticipate their use.
26. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Straley v.
Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Carr v. Warner, 137
F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955) ; Bunge v. Kirchhoff, 251 Ill. App. 119, 126 (1928).
27. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, supra
note 26; Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., supra note 26; Carr v. Warner,
supra note 26.
28. Kaye v. Sunbeam Quarries Co., 258 Ky. 190, 79 S.W.2d 700 (1935).
29. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961).
30. Farmers' Union Coop. Royalty Co. v. Little, 182 Okla. 178, 77 P.2d 33 (1938).
31. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Dale v. Rosen-
feld, 229 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. This allegation was made in the Royal Air case, supra note 31, at 213.
33. See 3 Loss, SECURrIES REGULATION 1816 (2d ed. 1961).
34. See generally H.R. REIP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1933) ; Hearings on
HR. 4314 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933) ; Hearings oi S. 875 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ; CoxFERENcE H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933); 77 CONG. REc. 2915-19 (1933) (remarks of Representative Rayburn);
id. at 2926-27 (remarks of Representative Kelly) ; id. at 2912 (remarks of Representative
Mapes).
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However, the policy of the act and the manner in which it is implemented
provide a more fruitful basis for interpreting the statute. The basic strategy
of the act is to foster informed investing by compelling disclosure of infor-
mation through the use of deterrent civil actions. Allowance of the defenses
of estoppel, waiver, and laches may in some cases lessen the plaintiff's chances
of recovery, and, by increasing the frequency of successful defenses, tend to
impair the deterrent function of the sections. To the extent that deterrence is in
fact lessened, allowance of the defenses may be incompatible with the main
goal of the act. On the other hand, the in terrorem effect was not intended to
apply with the pervasiveness of poison gas. Deterrence is tempered in the act
itself with defenses and limitations 35 which reflect a desire to retain some of
the remedial aspects - i.e., a primary concern for redress of harm already
incurred rather than for the prevention of future violations through inculcation
of fear - characteristic of civil actions. Moreover, in a civil suit, it tradition-
ally has been thought unfair to allow a plaintiff to recover in spite of his
actions inconsistent with the suit, where such actions were justifiably
and detrimentally relied upon by the defendant.36
A solution to the question of whether the defenses of estoppel, laches, and
waiver should be permitted may be found in an analysis of the civil liability
sections in light of the existing tension between the deterrent and remedial
policies embodied in the Act.
The strict liability under section 12(1) is one expression of the deterrent
nature of the civil liability provisions of the act. In a section 12(1) suit, the
major elements of the plaintiff's case are established by proof that the defend-
ant sold the securities to him by the use of the mails or of some means of
interstate transportation or communication, either in the absence of a regis-
tration statement or without providing the plaintiff-buyer with a prospectus
duplicating the registration statement.37 The plaintiff need not prove that he
relied upon, or that his damages were caused by, the seller's violation of the
section. The defendant's intent and knowledge of the violation are irrelevant,38
as is an assertion by a corporation that the acts resulting in liability were
ultra vires the corporation.39 The only way the defendant can escape liability
is to show that the sale of the particular security or transaction was exempted
from the coverage of section 12(1).40
35. E.g., the short statute of limitations, discussed at note 73 infra and accompanying
text, and the affirmative defenses under § 11, at notes 41-43 infra and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 180 (5th ed. 1941) and cases cited.
37. See text of §§ 5 and 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771 (1958), and notes 14 and
15 supra.
Two other elements of the plaintiff's case are: his compliance with the statute of
limitations, Newberg v. American, Dryer Corp., 195 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1961), and,
where rescission is sought, his compliance with the tender requirement.
As with § 12(2), the privity requirement under § 12(1) is tempered by § 15 of the
act, which extends liability to persons in control of the seller. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958).
38. 3 Loss, SEcUmxES REGULATION 1693 (2d ed. 1961).
39. Ibid.
40. See note 13 supra.
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The section 11 action also places few obstacles in the way of a plaintiff's
recovery and, thus, may indicate a primary concern for deterrence. Under
section 11 the plaintiff need prove only a misstatement or omission in the
registration statement. He need not furnish proof of scienter, of privity be-
tween himself and the defendants, of actual reliance upon the untruth or
omission, or of a causal relationship between the defect and his loss. How-
ever, unlike the section 12(1) defendant, the section 11 defendant is given
several affirmative defenses. Damages are reduced to the extent that the de-
fendant can prove that they did not result from the violation.41 In addition,
the defendant can prevail upon a showing that the plaintiff knew of the un-
truth or omission at the time he acquired the security,42 and any defendant
other than the issuer can escape liability if he can prove that he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and actually believed
that the statements were true and that there were no misleading omissions.43
Although these defenses may inject an element of concern for remedy not
present in section 12(1), the very difficult proof problems which the defenses
entail imply that they were not expected to remove the deterrent function from
section 11.
In addition to the deterrent aspects apparent on the face of sections 11 and
12(1), the fact that these provisions interact to impose disclosure require-
ments on the initial distribution of securities lends support to the inference
that deterrence was a central goal of these sections. An initial issuance and
distribution of a block of securities will generally have greater public impact,
in terms of both the number of people affected and the amount of money in-
volved, than an isolated sale subsequent to the initial distribution. 44 Congress,
perhaps in recognition of this greater impact, imposed a requirement of ad-
ministrative evaluation of the information thought necessary to assure informed
investing before the issue is distributed ;45 the SEC procedure created in the
act was thus designed to prevent harm to investors before it occurred. Section
12(1), insofar as it coerces compliance with this requirement of filing infor-
mation with the SEC, is concerned with deterrence rather than with the
redress of damages already incurred. Moreover, congressional concern for full
disclosure during the initial distribution extended beyond requiring registra-
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1958).
42. 15U.S.C.§77k(a) (1958).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1958).
44. The impact of §§ 11 and 12(1) also seems broader in terms of the number of
transactions affected. Although § 12(2) does not generally reach over-the-counter and
exchange transactions (see text accompanying notes 22 & 23 supra), securities traded on
exchanges and over-the-counter markets will, in all likelihood, have been issued and dis-
tributed under circumstances that involve §§ 11 and 12(1), and the price of such secu-
rities will be affected by the information disclosed in the registration statement and the
statutory prospectus.
45. See note 14 supra. The Commission is empowered to seek injunctions against
violations of the act (§ 77t), and criminal penalties may be imposed for willful violations
(§ 77x).
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tion with the SEC. Section 12(1) was also designed to compel dissemination
of the information in the registration statement to all purchasers in the chain
of initial distribution through a prospectus identical to the registration state-
ment. Section 11 was devised to assure the accuracy and completeness of this
information. This prospectus "conditions" the market by supplying to the
securities industry and the investing public basic facts on which investment
decisions are, in large part, founded; because of this conditioning effect, the
prospectus plays a major role in determining the marketability of the secu-
rity.4 6 It thus appears that Congress, aware of the great impact of the pro-
spectus on the securities market, intended section 11 to operate in a preven-
tive fashion - to secure complete and honest disclosure by increasing the
possibility of successful civil suits - rather than to cure the harm after it had
occurred. In view of the importance placed on the deterrent nature of these
sections, and in the absence of competing considerations, the defenses of
waiver, estoppel, and laches should not be allowed.
4 7
On the other hand, it could be argued that allowance of the defenses would
not lessen the deterrent function of sections 11 and 12(1): it might be un-
realistic to expect an issuer or seller to violate the Act in the hope that his
victims will shield him from liability by subsequently engaging in some con-
duct amounting to waiver, estoppel, or laches.48 However, this argument
overlooks the fact that the sections are as much concerned with creating a
general climate of fear of the statutory civil actions as they are with deterring
the individual who is consciously considering whether to comply with the
act. More frequent success of defendants in these actions might well lead to
a less forbidding atmosphere, and, to the extent this occurs, conscientious,
adherence to the disclosure requirements by the securities industry may be
lessened. An additional argument could be made that the improvement of
46. This market conditioner concept is implicitly recognized in- a 1934 amendment
to § 11. It provides that if a year has elapsed since the effective date of the registration
statement, and if the issuer has made generally available to the public an earnings state-
ment covering that first year, any plaintiff acquiring his securities after the year must
prove that he acquired the security in reliance upon the defective registration statement.
48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958). This is in contrast to a plaintiff who
acquired his stock within the one year, who need not prove reliance.
This provision apparently is based on the assumption that the facts in, the regis-
tration statement will be vital factors in establishing the market value of the secu-
rities for some time after the effective date, and that consequently there should be
no necessity for proving reliance by the investor. After one year, however, it is
assumed that the facts presented in the registration statement will be so out of date
as not materially to affect the market value of the security and that an investor
should be entitled to recover only if he can sustain the burden of proof that he was
misled through actual reliance upon the registration statement.
MCCoIUCK, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRiTIEs ACT AND THE S.E.C. 167 (1948).
47. Thus, Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1961), by allowing the defenses of estoppel and waiver in a § 12(1) action, is inconsistent
with the reasoning and conclusions expressed here. See also note 6 supra.
48. See Note, 62 YAuB L.J. 985, 996 (1953).
19641 1483
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ethical standards in the industry 49 and the dearth of lawsuits for registration
statement violations rO indicate that a relaxation of the in terrorem effect would
not hinder operation of the act. But this argument also seems shortsighted,
since it ignores the possibility that the reason the industry is more ethical
and few suits are brought is that the deterrent nature of the sections is operat-
ing as intended.5 1
Significant differences between the sections concerned with initial distribu-
tion and section 12(2), which ordinarily applies to sales subsequent to initial
distribution, suggest that in section 12 (2) Congress was more concerned with
providing a remedy for losses incurred and less concerned with in terrorem
deterrence than in sections 11 and 12(1). Since section 12(2), in effect, applies
only to individual sales after distribution, and since information misstated in
a section 12(2) sale will not condition the general market for the securities,
no overriding concern with a large impact on the public is involved in this
section. Therefore, a de-emphasis of the deterrent function in section 12(2)
would not have been expected to have the same broad economic implications
as a lessening of deterrence in sections 11 and 12(1).
Unlike section 11 and 12(1) actions, which implement statutory innova-
tions 52 and a complex regulatory procedure, the section 12(2) action appears
to be basically a statutory counterpart to common law rescission; 63 many
elements of the causes of action are identical. 54 The primarily remedial nature
of common law rescission is demonstrated by its focus on making the plaintiff
49. See Loss, Foreword, Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation, 45 VA.
L. REv. 787 (1959). As early as 1945, the SEC felt that
New standards prevail in the business of inducing investors to part with their
money. ... There now prevail new concepts of fair dealing, of adequate disclosure
and of the duties of management and insiders. The general acceptance of these
ethical standards by the business community is reflected not alone in the policies
and outlook of those subject to the Commission's jurisdiction but it is also evi-
denced in many respects in the practices of businesses not within the jurisdiction
of the Commission.
10 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 8 (1945).
50. See 3 Loss, SECuiITrEs REGULATION 1684-89 (2d ed. 1961).
51. Moreover, derogation from congressional intent as expressed in the act on the
basis of a supposed change in, securities industry ethics would seem to be an improper
method of statutory construction. Such changes in the basic design of the act should be
the province of Congress; for a court to rewrite the act in such fashion would be a very
transparent form of judicial legislation.
52. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
53. Although the legislative history of § 12(2) is unclear, several commentators have
made this inference. See, e.g., 3 Loss, SEcuRIIEs REGULATION 1700 (2d ed. 1961);
Bane, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 14 B.U.L. Rxv. 35, 42 (1934).
54. The common-law requirement that the plaintiff prove a misstatement or omission
of a material fact was not changed by § 12(2). Neither action requires the plaintiff to
prove a causal relationship between the misstatement and the decline in value of the
security, and both actions bar the plaintiff's recovery if he knew of the misstatement or
omission at the time he acquired the security.
Since the defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches were allowed at common law, the
resemblance may imply that the defenses were not meant to be abrogated in § 12(2).
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whole by restoring the status quo, and by including the estoppel, waiver, and
laches defenses, which permit courts to achieve equitable results by recogniz-
ing the defendant's detrimental reliance on the plaintiff's prior conduct in-
consistent with the later desire to rescind.
The section 12(2) suit, however, differs in several respects from the rescis-
sion action at common law, and these deviations may reflect an effort to bolster
the plaintiff's position. The question, then, is whether section 12(2) shifts
the emphasis of the action from redress of damage to deterrence of harm to
such an extent that allowing waiver, estoppel, and laches would be incon-
sistent with the policy of the section. The advantages given to the plaintiff
in section 12(2) not available in the non-statutory action include a choice of
federal or state jurisdiction, 5 and, if federal jurisdiction is chosen, the rights
to nationwide service of process and a broad choice of venue.56 The section
12(2) plaintiff is also given a choice of remedy - he may either tender the
securities and demand return of the purchase price, or sue for damages rep-
resenting his monetary loss - whereas in the rescission action tender is
required.r7 A third advantage under 12 (2) is that the plaintiff need not prove
his reliance on the misstatement or omission.58 On the other hand, the
section 12(2) plaintiff is faced with a defense with which he was not con-
fronted in the non-statutory action :r0 the defendant can prevail if he proves
that "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of [the] untruth or omission."60 In addition, the short one year 61
statute of limitations facing the plaintiff in a section 12(2) action was gen-
erally absent in the common-law action. In sum, the protection afforded plain-
tiffs by section 12(2) does not seem to be significantly greater than that given
by common law rescission, and it may be inferred that no major shift in focus
toward deterrence was intended in section 12(2).
Finally, the greater emphasis of section 12(2) on remedy rather than deter-
rence can also be seen by comparing the apparent concern for defendants in
section 12(2) with that in sections 11 and 12(1). In section 12(2) defendants
escape liability if they can show that the violation was neither intentional nor
negligent. Under section 11 only defendants other than the issuer have this
defense, and under section 12(1) no defendant can escape liability through
such a showing. In these latter actions deterrence is furthered by holding
defendants liable in spite of objections that the violation was innocently com-
mitted. The existence of the defense of innocent misrepresentation in section
55. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1958).
56. Ibid.
57. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1116 (1951) ; Shulman Civil Liability and the Securities
Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 244 (1933).
58. Shulman, supra note 57, at 247. Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939),
aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
59. See Shulman, supra note 57, at 243.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
61. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
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12(2) removes this element of deterrence, and to this extent section 12(2)
is more remedial in nature than sections 11 and 12(1).
In view of the primarily remedial rather than deterrent nature of section
12(2), allowance of the waiver, estoppel, and laches defenses appears to be in
harmony with the policy of the section.6 2 However, this should not be taken
to imply that the section is entirely without deterrent purpose. Section 12(2)
is more than a simple codification of common law rescission, and although,
in effect, it places less emphasis on deterrence than sections 11 and 12(1), the
section is nevertheless an integral part of the statutory scheme designed to
protect investors. In order to maintain this ambivalent statutory policy, a
court should not relax the common-law requisites of the various defenses;
such relaxation might well undercut the basic protective policy of the Act and
thwart the subsidiary deterrent function of section 12(2).
For example, a court considering an estoppel defense should insist upon
adequate proof that the plaintiff has made a representation, either by words
or deeds, which would induce a reasonable man in the defendant's position to
detrimentally rely on the representation, and which has in fact induced such
reliance.6 3 One element of this defense has presented a recurring problem for
courts and should be carefully considered in the 12(2) context: whether the
collection of acts done and statements made by the plaintiff amounts to a
representation sufficient to justify reliance by the defendant. The common-law
and Blue Sky cases do not present a uniform or systematic answer to this
question, partly because the answer must depend on many variable facts; a
minor change in a fact situation could easily produce the opposite result. One
situation in which the question of the sufficiency of the representation may
arise is presented by those cases where estoppel is sought on the grounds that
the plaintiff, after he had learned of the violation, participated in the affairs
of the corporation whose securities he bought. At one end of the spectrum,
the buyer may have participated in the affairs of the business rather insig-
nificantly by actions such as giving proxies, accepting dividends, or attending
meetings to vote his stock when his holdings did not affect control of the
corporation. 64 In the ordinary case, such acts would not constitute a represen-
tation that the plaintiff-buyer was relinquishing his right to sue, and reliance
on such acts would not be justified.65 At the other end of the spectrum, how-
ever, the buyer's participation in the business may have been so great that he
achieved control of the corporation.66 In this case the representation, if detri-
mentally relied upon, would appear to be sufficient to estop the plaintiff. For
62. See text following note 54 upra. This conclusion is apparently shared by Pro-
fessor Loss, who assumes that, at least where the plaintiff's action. is for rescission rather
than damages, the defenses are carried over into § 12(2). 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATiON
1702 (2d ed. 1961).
63. 3 POmEROY, EQUITY JTUMSPRUDENCE 191-92 (5th ed. 1941).
64. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1956), and analogous Blue
Sky cases cited in 3 Loss, SEcumrrlEs REGULATION 1678 nn.236-37 (2d ed. 1961).
66. Cf. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
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cases between these two extremes, the almost infinite factual nuances preclude
any generalizations about their outcome.
67
As with estoppel, a court considering the waiver defense under section
12(2) should not relax the common-law requisites of the defense 68 - a volun-
tary and intentional relinquishment of a known and existing legal right or
claim which either was given for a consideration or was given without con-
sideration but did in fact induce detrimental reliance by the defendant. Thus,
for example, if the investor, having told the seller of his intent to waive, later
decided not to waive and informed the seller of this before the seller had
detrimentally relied upon the previous statement, the requirements for waiver
should not be deemed to have been satisfied.
Despite the theoretical applicability of the estoppel, waiver, and laches de-
fenses in section 12(2) suits, other sections of the act may prevent their use.
Although no other provision of the act appears to affect the availability of
estoppel as a defense, section 14 does raise questions as to the waiver defense;
it provides that
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.69
This section might seem, at first glance, to dispose of the question of the ap-
plicability of waiver as a defense. But the Supreme Court, applying section
14 to section 12(2) in Wilko v. Swan,70 distinguished between waivers before
and after the existence of a controversy; it held that a stipulation made prior
to the controversy would not be binding, but stated that a waiver after the
buyer has been alerted to the precise illegality involved would not be objec-
tionable, since the buyer would then be "able to judge the weight of the
handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary."7 1 Similarly, the Court
has applied this distinction to an anti-waiver clause in at least one other federal
statute designed to protect those in an unequal bargaining position.72 There-
fore, section 14 does not seem to dispose of a consideration of the waiver de-
fense based on the buyer's conduct after he learns of his right to bring suit.
Unlike the waiver and estoppel defenses, the laches defense in section 12(2)
actions appears to be barred by a separate provision of the act. Section 13 of
67. In each case, however, the trier of fact should insist upon clear proof of acts
sufficient to constitute a representation. See text following note 62 supra.
68. As modified by § 14 of the act. See notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
69. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1958).
70. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
71. Id. at 435.
72. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1948) (anti-waiver clause of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act) ; see also Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp.
111, 116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), where the court, construing the anti-waiver clause of the
Securities Exchange Act, did not pass on the validity of a waiver after the dispute had
come into existence, but pointed out that the arguments and considerations invalidating
a waiver before the existence of a controversy are not present in, the case of a waiver of
an existing claim. The distinction is also urged in Note, Enforceability of Arbitration
Agreements in Fraud Actions under the Securities Act, 62 YAiE L.J. 985, 994-96 (1953).
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the act imposes a very short statute of limitations on section 12 (2) actions -
the plaintiff must bring suit within one year after his actual or constructive
discovery of the misstatement or omission, and in no event may he bring suit
if three years have elapsed since the sale.73 One function of the laches defense
at common law was to impose a temporal limitation on the life of a cause of
action to which no statute of limitations applied; frequently the basis of the
defense was the plaintiff's unconscionable delay in bringing suit. And in
actions governed by a statute of limitations running from the time of the vio-
lation, laches was often used to prevent unconscionable delay after the plain-
tiff had knowledge of the violation.74 Both the laches defense, when used in
suits for which the statute of limitations is measured from the time of viola-
tion, and the Securities Act device of measuring the statute of limitations from
the date of plaintiff's knowledge of the violation share at least the one common
function of preventing the plaintiff's unconscionable delay in bringing suit.76
Thus Congress appears to have substituted the one year limit for the uncon-
scionable delay standard, and the laches defense should not be allowed in the
section 12(2) suit.7 6 Moreover, the very fact of a short one year statute of
73. 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (amended by 48 Stat. 908 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77m (1958)). As originally enacted, the limitation was two years from actual or con-
structive knowledge of the defect, and there was no absolute limit, three years or other-
wise, measured from the date of sale. The original limitations on § 11 actions were two
years from actual or constructive knowledge, and no more than ten years after the secu-
rity was first offered to the public; for § 12(1), two years from the date of sale, and
the same ten year limit. The 1934 amendment shortened the periods for both actions to
one and three years, respectively.
The changes of the statute of limitations appear to have been a concession to the secu-
rities industry, which feared the harshness of the act and clamored for mitigation. See
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1933, p. 1, col. 4; Dean, Twenty-Five Years of Federal
Securities Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 COLum. L. Rv.
697, 713-14 (1959). See also McCoRMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND
THE S.E.C. 184 (1948), where the reasons for the shortening are believed to be a fear
of strike suits, and a recognition that the longer periods are unnecessary for the protec-
tion. of the legitimate investor.
74. See 3 PomERov, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 917 (5th ed. 1941).
75. The inconsistency of allowing the laches defense to cut short a statute of limita-
tions measured from the time of knowledge has been recognized by courts outside the
context of the Securities Act. See, e.g., Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 242, 193
Pac. 243, 250 (1920) ; Estudillo v. Security Loan & Trust Co., 149 Cal. 556, 565, 87 Pac.
19, 23 (1906).
76. Of necessity this implies that the plaintiff gets a "free ride" from the time he
learns of the violation until the statutory period runs out (i.e., if the value of the secu-
rity declines he can still get back the purchase price, and if it increases in spite of the
violation, he will keep the security). This free ride may be less than a year, however, if
his actual or constructive knowledge of the violation occurred more than two years after
the sale. Moreover, it is unlikely that any plaintiff would be motivated to sue until the
value of the stock decreases, even in the absence of any intent to get a free ride on the
market; disallowing a plaintiff's recovery by use of the laches defense would bar recovery
by numerous plaintiffs. This would seem contrary to Congress' intent to protect mis-
informed investors. See text following note 62 supra.
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limitations may imply that the laches defense is unavailable under the Act.77
Of course, the laches defense only goes to the question of the time factor;
insofar as the delay is accompanied by other conduct inconsistent with the
assertion of the plaintiff's section 12(2) rights, questions of waiver and estop-
pel are involved.
The question of the applicability of the estoppel, waiver, and laches defenses
has also arisen in the context of the increasingly frequent use of SEC rule
lOb-5 by plaintiffs to redress grievances similar to those covered by sections
11, 12(1), and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. The relevant portions of
rule lOb-5 declare unlawful the use by any person of the mails or the chan-
nels of interstate commerce to make an untrue statement or a misleading
omission of a material fact.78 While rule lOb-5 does not explicitly provide a
remedy, in order to make the rule effective courts have inferred a private
civil action for violation of its provisions.7 A basic problem posed by the
judicial creation of the lOb-5 civil suit is raised by those cases wherein the
operative facts appear to permit suit under either rule lOb-5 or one of the civil
liability provisions of the 1933 act: is lOb-5 to be applied independently of
the 1933 act, or is the rule to be read in conjunction with the act, so that
lOb-5 plaintiffs will not be able to escape the limitations and defenses which
would apply if the suit were brought under the corresponding section of the
act?8o The more narrow question presented by this Note is whether the de-
77. See 3 Loss, SECuRIEs REGULATION 1777 & n.236 (2d ed. 1961).
78. The rule is drafted very broadly, and includes no reference to requirements of
privity, reliance, causation, or scienter:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
79. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
80. Of the many cases wrestling with this problem, perhaps the most thoughtful con-
sideration appears in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). There the court, recog-
nizing the anomaly of their decision, decided to allow the plaintiff-buyer to sue under
rule lob-5 free of the restrictions imposed by the 1933 Act:
While it assumes that Congress in 1934 undid what it carefully did in 1933, it avoids
judicial rewriting of the 1934 Act to include procedural provisions which appear
only in the 1933 Act.
Id. at 274. But compare Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1948), where the court stated that "it cannot be supposed that Congress intended to abolish
these regulations and limitations [in §§ 11 and 12] when it enacted Sec. 10 of the Act of
1934." Id. at 124. On the general lack of uniformity of courts regarding 10b-5, and the
problems they face in applying it, see 3 Loss, SEcuriTIEs REGuLATI N 1763-97 (2d ed.
1961).
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fenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches should apply to rule lOb-5 actions used
as a substitute for civil liability suits under the 1933 act. If a court decides
that rule lOb-5 should be read together with the particular section of the 1933
act for which it is being substituted, the common law defenses should, of
course, apply to the same extent urged for that section. 8' One exception in
this across-the-board application of the defenses may occur in the case of the
laches defense. There is no federal statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions,
and most courts have applied the statute of limitations of the state in which
the violation occurred.82 This has meant that the statutes governing lOb-5
actions are invariably longer than the one year limitation under section 13,
and often more than three years.8 3 If parity is desired between the two actions
in this respect, the laches defense might be allowed in the lOb-5 suit to limit
the time within which suit may be brought in order to coincide with the time
limit under the corresponding section of the 1933 act.
However, rule lOb-5 may be read to give plaintiffs a remedy completely
independent of the Securities Act. If the basis for the interpretation does not
involve the deterrence-remedy analysis, the court may wish to deny or allow
the defenses according to its reason for so construing the rule.84 If, however,
the court has analyzed the rule in terms of a tension between deterrent and
remedial functions, the problem of allowance of the defenses depends on which
function is considered more central to the purpose of the rule, and whether
allowance of the defenses is consistent with this purpose.
81. See text accompanying notes 47, 62, & 76 supra.
82. For deceit, or breach of warranty, or whatever local statute of limitations seems
most analogous to the case. See, e.g., Errion, v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956) ;
Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (D. Del.
1956).
83. See 3 Loss, SzcuRnlEs REGuLATI ON 1774 (2d ed. 1961), and cases cited in note
82 supra.
84. E.g., the decision may be based on reasoning like that in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1961).
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